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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
rationale when invalidating searches and seizures. 6 Some state courts
which have not used the wife's inability to waive the husband's rights
to keep out illegally seized evidence, do reach the same result by relying
on the doctrine of implied coercion.7
This case follows the general federal law in all particulars. It is good
that in its first decision on this point this court set a precedent which
more than likely will be easy to follow in the future." Apparently the
court felt that it should rely on the federal precedents now, rather than
having to rely on them at a later date.'
Matters relative to search and seizure used to be merely evidentiary
matters to be determined by the respective state courts. The decision
above seems to show that they are now being thought of as constitutional
issues and within the domain of federal jurisdiction.
R. H. Kraftson
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-RIGHT TO COUNSEL. In Bid-
dle v. Commonwealth' Mrs. Biddle appealed her conviction for the
6. See Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (1919).
Another case decided on the basis of coercion involved an agent, not the wife of de-
fendant, in re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co, 253 F. 605 (1918).
7. See People v. Lind, 370 I1. 131, 18 NE.2d 189 (1938); Meredith v. Commonwealth,
215 Ky. 705, 286 S.W. 1043 (1926); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490
(1936); Byrd v. State, 161 Tenn. 306, 30 S.W.2d 273 (1930); State v. Bonolo, 39 Wvo.
299, 270 Pac. 1065 (1928).
8. It appears that the federal courts are fast taking on the responsibility of deciding
what is proper procedure in state criminal trials. Weeks v. United States, 232 US.
383 (1913), established the rule that any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible in
a federal criminal trial. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) held that state law en-
forcement agencies must not violate this right, but left them free to introduce illegally
seized articles into evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the federal
exclusionary rule to the states in all cases of searches and seizures which violated the
Fourth Amendment.
9. The standard of determining what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
has been left to the states. Yet, here again we have indications that federal courts are
gradually extending their powers over state criminal law. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 at 33-34 (1963), points the way by saying that the trial court's findings of reasonable-
ness will be "respected only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees.
As we have stated above and in other cases involving federal constitutional rights, find-
ings of state courts are by no means insulated against examination here.... The States
are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches
and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures . . ." Thus future questions of
"reasonableness" before the Supreme Court will probably be determined on the basis
of federal law.
1. Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965).
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murder of her infant child. She claimed that the lower court erred by
admitting her confession because she had not been warned that she
could remain silent and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
a conviction of murder in the first degree, because the death of the
baby resulted from negligence and not from a malicious omission of
duty.
Mrs. Biddle and her husband were escorted to police headquarters
for routine questioning after an autopsy of the defendant's baby had
shown that the baby had died from malnutrition and dehydration. The
defendant was first questioned about the feeding and health of her child
and then her husband was questioned in another room. The detectives
then returned to the defendant and asked her if she wanted to tell the
truth. She then made incriminating statements about her child's
feedings.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that the incriminat-
ing statements were admissible but reversed her conviction because the
Commonwealth had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had wilfully or maliciously withheld food from the baby.2
The court held that the confession was admissible because it was vol-
untary and an officer's failure to warn a person that he may remain
silent does not render a voluntary confession inadmissible.3
When the defendant claimed that the case should be reversed because
she had not been informed of her right to remain silent, her right to
counsel is also involved.4 The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that the provision of counsel in all criminal cases "is a funda-
mental right, essential to a fair trial" and that this right applies to the
2. Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E2d 644 (1948); State v. Bischert,
131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 (1957); Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899). These
cases hold the general rule that if the omission to feed one's baby is negligent and not
willful, then the case is manslaughter and not murder.
3. Mendoza v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 961, 103 S.E.2d, 1 (1958).
4. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). When the United States Supreme
Court held that the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by
using evidence against him of incriminating statements made to co-defendants after
their indictment and in the absence of the defendant's retained counsel and which were
overheard on radio by a government agent without the defendant's knowledge, the court
has read part of the Fifth Amendment into the sixth and joined them in order
to assure the protection of the constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel
in the Federal Courts. If the defendant weren't allowed to consult with his counsel
he might not know of his right to remain silent or why and how he should take ad-
vantage of this right.
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment.r The due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits state infringement of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 6 The Supreme Court then held
that in Federal Courts the right to counsel attaches at the time he is
indicted.7 In Escobedo v. State8 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that where an investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the particular suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incrim-
inating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an oppor-
tunity to consult with his attorney, and police officers have not effec-
tively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent,
the accused has been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment and any statements elicited by the police during the
interrogation may not be used against him at a criminal trial.
Applying Escobedo causes a problem of determining at what time
the questioning focuses on the defendant and become accusatorial. In
Escobedo9 the defendant had requested and was denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer while he was being questioned by the police.
Therefore the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation and
had focused on Escobedo. The Supreme Court of California has held
that when a defendant is in police custody and the police carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating state-
ments, even though he does not request counsel, since the investigation
has focused on him he has a right to counsel. 10
In Cooper vu. Commonwealth" the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held that the alleged confession made by the defendant while he
was without his retained counsel was inadmissable since the investigation
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
7. Massiah v. United States, supra note 4.
8. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9. Ibid.
10. People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964); Neely v. State, 398 P.2d
482 (Ore. 1964), also follows the dictum of Dorado.
11. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965). While the defend-
ant was in jail awaiting trial a tape recording was played back to him on which the
girl he was supposed to have attacked made incriminating statements. Defendant made
an alleged confession after hearing the recording and while being interrogated. Though
he had been advised of his rights the court held since his intelligence was low, as was
his ability to function under stress, the interrogation was accusatory rather than inves-
tigatory and Cooper needed the assistance of his counsel at this point.
[Vol. 7:196
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had focused on him, it was accusatorial and Cooper needed the assistance
of counsel at this point. Therefore his constitutional right to counsel
had been denied him. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia dis-
tinguished Biddle because the circumstances under which the confes-
sions were obtained in Escobedo and Cooper were not present. The
court held that the questioning had not focused on the defendant when
she made her confession and that since the investigation was still general
and not accusatorial her absolute right to counsel had not attached. By
holding the Escobedo test of the admissibility of a confession inappli-
cable this left the court to rely on the older rule that a confession is
admissible as long as it is voluntary 12 and that the failure of an officer to
inform the defendant of her right to remain silent does not make a volun-
tary confession, made during a routine investigation, inadmissible. 3
Peter Broccoletti
12. Mendoza v. Commonwealth, supra note 3.
13. Biddle v. Commonwealth, supra note 1.
